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Unexpected releases of highly hazardous chemicals have occurred numerous times in 
process industries. One of the keys contributing factors that could prevent these 
accidents are by managing operating procedures according to established standards. One 
of the established industrial standards to manage Operating Procedures (OP) is specified 
under the code of federal regulations Chapter 29 Section 1910.119(f) in Process Safety 
Management (PSM) regulations. However, accident still can happen if the requirements 
of the standard not implemented as intended. Investigations revealed that despite the 
prevention efforts, the classical safety management approach is not effective enough to 
prevent major accidents from happening. The unavailability of easy technique for 
industries to comply with PSM requirements had delayed industries‟ efforts to 
accomplish best practices of PSM.  
 
This study proposes a structured system to simplify the working process of OP that 
complies with OSHA PSM 29 CFR 1910.119(f). Piping and Instrumentation Diagram 
(P&ID) is used as a foundation for OP data management. It act as the basis to manage 
documentation, track required actions related and captures critical information 
pertaining to the process and thus prevent the missing of information related to 
Operating Procedures. 
 
With a structured and systematic way in implementing the OP element of PSM, it is 
expected that best practices of PSM program helped to achieve operational excellence, 
manifesting in increased productivity, higher quality of deliverables, reduced waste, 
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1.1 BACKGROUND STUDY 
 
Safety experts and regulatory bodies believe that catastrophic events such as 
Flixborough explosion, Bhopal toxic plume release and other examples of major 
disasters could be prevented by a proper application of process safety management 
techniques. To address and handle the issue legally, the Congress of Occupation Safety 
and Health Act of 1970 has created Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) to assure safe and healthful working conditions for men and women by setting 
and enforcing standards through training, education and assistance. According to OSH 
Act, employers must comply to OSHA regulations which requires them to keep their 
workplace free of major recognized hazards [1]. 
One of the established standards developed by OSHA that highlight the importance of 
safety in process industries is Process Safety Management (PSM) 29 CFR 1910.119 of 
Highly Hazardous Chemicals (HHC). The purpose of the PSM standard is aligned with 
the OSHA‟s objective that is to prevent or minimize the consequences of catastrophic 
releases of toxic, reactive, flammable, or explosive chemicals [2].  
In present study, the main element that will be discussed thoroughly is Operating 
Procedures, CFR 1910.119(f). Due to the fact that all of those elements are interlinked 
and interdependent with each other, the other 13 elements will also be described 
interchangeably to meet PSM requirements. Each of the 14 elements contributes 
information or utilizes information from other elements in order to be completed [3].  
With a structured and systematic way in handling associated risks from highly 
hazardous chemicals, best practices of PSM program helped to achieve operational 
excellence, manifesting in increased productivity, higher quality of deliverables, reduced 




1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
A common thread in all major incidents is the complexity of process plant operations. 
Therefore, a written standard operating procedure must be compiled and comprehend to 
ensure safe operation when performing any related activities. Written operating 
procedure must be consistent with the data embedded in process safety information.  
Despite the abundant precautions and stringent regulation provided worldwide on PSM 
program, incidents continue to occur on a regular basis due to insufficient understanding 
the urgency to identify best practices and drive for process safety improvements in the 
organization [5].  
Designing and implementing by using a complete work process for PSM-related 
activities can help to maintain an effective PSM program [6]. However, a major 
challenge is unavailability of easy technique for industries to comply with PSM 
requirements and maintain the effective process safety programs. Thus, there is a need to 
develop a system towards a smooth implementation of PSM program in process 
industries to ensure safe operation with respect to the compliance of PSM requirements. 
 
1.3 OBJECTIVE(S) 
The main objective to be achieved by the end of this study is to develop a structured 
system to manage Operating Procedures and its compliance with OSHA PSM 29 CFR 
1910.119(f). It is supported by few sub-objectives listed below which are; 
 To analyse PSM requirements for Operating Procedures [29 CFR 1910.119(f)] 
 To develop framework of OP  
 To develop database prototype tool for easy implementation 






1.4 SCOPE OF WORK 
 
For the project to be feasible within the time frame of 14 weeks, it will be divided into 




 The second part will be covered later in FYP2 which are: 
 
 
The first part will covers from step 1 until step 2, which is element‟s compliance up until 
development of model based on framework.  
The study is mainly to develop a standard system which is able to simplify the working 
process of the proposed standard. Current PSM standard requirement will be used and 
transformed to prototype tool. Validation of data from specific case studies will be 
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2.1 PREVIOUS MAJOR ACCIDENT(S) 
 
Unexpected releases of toxic, reactive or flammable liquids and gases in processes 
involving highly hazardous chemicals have been reported for many years. In order to be 
sustainable, the chemical, petroleum and other industries must strive for a balance 
between optimal performance of process operations and process safety, which must be 
treated as an integrated part of the plant operations [7]. 
In the late 1980s, many facilities experienced events which lead to catastrophic results 
that caused loss of life and properties. Pattern of the catastrophes began to emerge and 
make its appearance. Macza M. (2008) described the explosion of BASF plant, Germany 
in 1921 that destroyed the plant itself which had killed at least 430 people and damaging 
approximately 700 houses nearby.  
Later in 1947, another plant known as Monsanto Chemical Company‟s SS Grandcamp 
in Texas City was caught in fire and exploded which killed over 430 people as well. 
However, no specific legislative response was taken with respect to these incidents. The 
disaster happened in Flixborough UK (1974) and Bhopal Gas Disaster (1984) has been a 
wake-up call to the world industrial leaders to take action and ensure the industries 
follow best practices in preventing and mitigate risk of incidents [8].  
Studied conducted by Kidam et al. [9] stated that majority of accidents happened in the 
chemical process industry were mainly caused by technical and engineering failures. 




Figure 2.1 The general (pie chart) and immediate (bar chart) causes of accidents 
 
From the above figure, it indicates that majority of the accidents are caused by technical 
failures (73%), followed by organizational (23%) and unknown (4%). Special attention 
is given on „human engineering error‟ since it will resulted into technical failures. 
Among typical examples of „human engineering error‟ is wrong work instruction, 
confusing control panel display and wrong labeling/specification.  
A similar study was conducted by PETRONAS Carigali Sdn. Bhd for their five (5) years 
effort in integrating process safety aspects in a HSE Management System. The study on 
process-related incidents is focus mainly on hydrocarbon release (HCR) covered 
incidents from 2004 to 2008 in PETRONAS Carigali domestic region. Findings are 
listed below in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Severity and Frequency of HCR Incidents for Region P from year 2004 to 2008 
[Source: SPE Asia Pacific Health, Safety, Security & Environment Conference and Exhibition] 









The roots causes for the incidents were as follows:- 
 52% were caused by erosion and corrosion 
 42% were caused by equipment failures such as seals leak, loose fittings/gasket 
 6% were contributed by human error 
 
Major failure identified was maintenance management. This contributed 67% to the total 
number of incidents. The other major failures were Hardware (11%), Design (7%) and 
Procedures (7%). The findings showed that process safety aspects have not been well 
understood and implemented [10]. 
PETRONAS Carigali has taken action to integrate Process Safety aspects with their 
existing HSE Management System by making it consistent with Process Safety 
Managements requirements as described in OSHA standard.  
 
2.2 PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT (29 CFR 1910.119) 
PSM regulations is specified by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) in the code of federal regulations Chapter 29 Section 1910.119 (CFR 29 
1910.119) [1]. OSHA‟s proposed standard emphasized the management of hazards 
associated with processes that uses highly hazardous chemicals (HHC).  
PSM, according to 29 CFR 1910.119 applies to 162 chemicals at or above the specified 
threshold on the OSHA PSM standards Appendix A list. In addition, it is also applies to 
a process that involves a flammable liquid or gas on site in one location in a quantity of 
10, 000 pounds or more [11]. However, PSM is exempted from retails facilities, 
petroleum operations and last but not least, unoccupied remote facilities.  
Eileen M. (2012) had emphasized that structured approach of PSM is needed to ensure 
safe operation by understanding 14 interrelated core elements in PSM that define the 
process system as shown in Table 2.2: 
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Table 2.2 PSM elements and standards 
No. PSM Elements PSM Standards 
1 Employee Participation  CFR 1910.119(c) 
2 Process Safety Information CFR 1910.119(d) 
3 Process Hazard Analysis CFR 1910.119(e) 
4 Operating Procedures  CFR 1910.119(f) 
5 Training Requirements  CFR 1910.119(g) 
6 Contractors  CFR 1910.119(h) 
7 Pre-startup Safety Review CFR 1910.119(i) 
8 Mechanical Integrity CFR 1910.119(j) 
9 Hot Work Permits  CFR 1910.119(k) 
10 Management of Change  CFR 1910.119(l) 
11 Incident Investigation CFR 1910.119(m) 
12 Emergency Planning and Response  CFR 1910.119(n) 
13 Compliance audits CFR 1910.119(o) 
14 Availability of trade secret information CFR 1910.119(p) 
 
2.2.1  Operating Procedures, 29 CFR 1910.119(f) 
Written operating procedures are necessary to ensure related activities are conducted in 
a safe manner. The employer need to develop and implement written procedures with a 
crystal clear instructions involving process activities that is consistent with respect to 
process safety information [12]. There are four sub-elements covered under Operating 
Procedures which are; operating phase, operating limits, safety and health considerations 
and safety systems and their functions. 
For operating phase, procedures must be developed for critical activities such as initial 
start-up, normal and temporary operations, normal and emergency shutdown, start-up 
following a turnaround, or after an emergency shutdown. Each of the operating phases 
should define operating limits that covers the consequences of deviations and required 
means to correct or avoid deviation.  
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Thirdly, the safety and health considerations should at least include hazards properties 
due to the chemical used in the process, necessary means to prevent exposure and its 
control measures, as well as the quality control for raw materials and the hazardous 
chemical inventory levels. 
Lastly, operating procedures should be readily accessible for easy reference by the 
employees. It must be up-to-date and reviewed as often as necessary to reflect the 
current operating practice. Employer must also develop and implement safety work 
practices to provide hazards control during operations which applies to employees and 
contractors. 
Despite the principles and essential features of OSHA PSM to operate facility safely, the 
established practices are not being followed [13].  Klein (2005) says that even the most 
technologically advanced plant in the world will not have a safe operating track record 
unless the individuals are dedicated and committed towards safe operations. This could 
be achieved through this study by proposing a simplified prototype tool and easy 


















3.1 WORKING PROCESS 
In developing Operating Procedures Management System, author must study and 
understand PSM standard as has been stated in the OSHA‟s requirements. From earlier 
discussion, it is observed that some of PSM elements have an inter-connection with each 
other, but the scope of study will only covers one element; Operating Procedures.  
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3.2 ANALYSIS THE REQUIREMENTS OF OPERATING PROCEDURES 
Basically, the project is started with analysing the requirements of the OP element of 
PSM standard. Analysing OP requirements of PSM is important to discover the 
requirements to comply with the 29 CFR 1910.119(f). Analysing phase has taken half of 
the semester period in conducting FYP I before continuing to develop OP framework. 
Among the ways to analyse OP requirements are by reading through related PSM 
articles, journals and also can be obtained through online resources. 
 
3.3 DEVELOPMENT OF FRAMEWORK  
Author proceeds in constructing the framework for OP which is quite similar to the 
flowcharts constructed by OSHA. The frameworks is developed using an engineering 
standpoint and in the same time, operates without violating OSHA PSM regulations. It 
is considered the backbone of the project that summarizes vital information and clear 
strategy in implementing proposed technique. The framework illustrates step by step 
process that need to be perform according to the OP requirements. Enhanced P&ID has 
been used as a basis for OP information management. 
Frameworks have been sent to AP Dr. Azmi M. Shariff, who has been assigned to 
supervise this project. After review and modification phase is done and frameworks 
have been approved by him, the author will implement the frameworks using computer 
programming aid as a working interface known as Microsoft Access software.  
 
3.4 DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATING PROCEDURE MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM (OPMS) AS PROCESS MODEL 
Several tools are used to assist author in developing the prototype model. Listed below 
are the required tools towards the project‟s completion: 
(a) Microsoft Office Word – To develop framework 
(b) Microsoft Office Excel – To develop model 
(c) Microsoft Office Access  – To develop prototype tool 
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Interface system is developed using Microsoft Office Access has the flexibility to allow 
any changes on the latest information provided. Incomplete information also will be 
detected and hence, shows an alert that calls necessary actions to be taken. 
 
3.5 CASE STUDY 
The best option in validating the proposed concept for OP implementation is by using 
the real process plant data. A case study was conducted using data from a refinery Plant 
X in the oil and gas industry in Malaysia. The industrial data collected from LPG 
Treating Unit on 23
rd
 October 2012 was used to study the removal of Hydrogen Sulfide 
(H2S) and reduction of Mercaptan (R-SH) content in various LPG blendstock (C3 & 
C4). Since LPG is known as hazardous substance according to OSHA 29 CFR 
1910.1200, therefore Plant X is obliged to comply with OSHA PSM standards and 
regulations. Table 3.1 describes the implementation strategies that were used in 
conducting case studies at Plant X. 
 
3.5.1 Case Study 1: Amine System 
In Amine Section, there are 3 Phase Separators equipped with fiber-filmTM contactor 
where the LPG get benefit from contacting with fresher amine when moving from the 
third, second and lastly to the first separator. LPG feed is then introduced into top of 
separator shroud. MDEA in the fiber-filmTM contactor flows downward adhering to the 
fibers till it enter aqueous phase. LPG concurrently flow & disengages upon entering 
hydrocarbon phase. H2S is removed to amine stream. The process flow for Amine 





Figure 3.1 Simplified Process Block Diagram for Amine Section 
 
 
3.5.2 Case Study 2: Caustic System 
For Caustic Section, there are two Phase Separators that equipped with fiber-film 
contactor. 20
o
Be caustic is used to extract Mercaptan (R-SH). Mercaptan in LPG is 
extracted to sodium mercaptide and transferred to caustic stream. Treated LPG is then 
exit the second Separators to Unit A for further separation or direct to rundown. The 
process flow for Caustic Section is simplified in Figure 3.2 below: 
 
Figure 3.2 Simplified Process Block Diagram for Caustic Section 
 
  
Table 3.1 OP Implementation strategy for Plant X 
Sub-standard OP  requirement OP for Plant X 
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1) Develop written operating procedures  
Develop initial operating procedure for 
each operating phase 
   
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(i) 
For each operating phase, below are the operating procedures that 
needs to be fulfill; 
Evidence documents to prove OPs exist 
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(i)(A) Initial startup 
 
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(i)(B) Normal operations 
 
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(i)(C)  Temporary operations 
 
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(i)(D) Emergency shutdown 
 
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(i)(E)  Emergency operation 
 
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(i)(F) Normal shutdown 
 
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(i)(G) Startup following a turnaround, or after an emergency shutdown. 
 
   
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(ii) Each operating procedures must address operating limits as below:  
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(ii)(A) Consequences of deviation 
Ensure deviation of each operating limits 
address its consequences and corrective 
measures 
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(ii)(B) Steps required to correct or avoid deviation. 
 
   
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(iii) 
Each operating procedures must consider safety and health as 
below:  
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(iii)(A) Properties of chemicals hazards used in the process 
 
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(iii)(B) Precautions to prevent chemical exposure, including engineering 





29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(iii)(C)  Control measures to be taken if physical contact or airborne 
exposure   
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(iii)(D) 
Quality control for raw materials and hazardous chemical inventory 
levels  
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(iii)(E)  Any unique/special hazards 
 
   
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(iv) Safety systems and their functions. Safety related system in Plant X 
   
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(2) 
Operating procedures shall be readily accessible to employees who 
work in or maintain a process.  
   
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(3) 
(a) Operating procedures review frequently to assure that they 
reflect current operating practice, that results from changes in 
process chemicals, technology, equipment, and changes to 
facilities. 
Monitoring existing OP to ensure that 
they capture changes in current operating 
practice  
 
(b) Operating procedures are certify annually  
Track, update and re-certified OP of Plant 
X every year  
   
29 CFR 1910.119(f)(4) 
(a) Develop safe work practices to provide for the control of 
hazards during operations such as lockout/tagout; confined space 
entry; opening process equipment or piping 
 
 
Ensure safe work practices exists 
 
(b) Develop safe work practices to provide for the control over 
entrance into a facility by maintenance, contractor, laboratory, or 
other support personnel.  
 
 
(c) These safe work practices apply to employees and contractor 
employees. 




3.6 PROJECT’S ACTIVITIES & SCHEDULE 
For this semester, project‟s activities will focus on developing prototype tool by using Microsoft Access. Apart from that, author will 
also demonstrate and validate case studies using data obtained from the industry. The initial prototype tool is changing from time to 
time depending on the case studies so that the model is fit-for-purpose for process industries. Table 3.2 below shows suggested 
project‟s milestone for Final Year Project II. 
Table 3.2 Key milestone for FYP II 
No.  Detail/Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 













FYP 1 2 Analysis of element OP requirements 
3 Develop framework and model 
4 Develop prototype tool using Microsoft Access                             
5 Gather industrial data                             
6 Validate case study                             
7 Submission of Progress Report             5/11               
8 Project Work Continues                             
9 Pre-SEDEX                   26/11         
10 Submission of Draft Report                     3/12       
11 Submission of Dissertation (soft bound)                       10/12     
12 Submission of Technical Paper                       10/12     
13 Oral Presentation                         19-25/12   




RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
4.1 REQUIREMENTS OF OSHA PSM CFR 1910.119(F) 
The element of Operating Procedures in process industries should follow the standards outlined 
by OSHA PSM 29 CFR 1910.119. Table 4.1 shows the essential keys in the element of OP that 
used as a backbone to develop the OP framework. 
Table 4.1 Standards of OP in CFR 1910.119(f) 
Standards Description 
1910.119(f)(1) The employer shall develop and implement written operating procedures that 
consistent with the process safety information and address the following 
elements: 
(i) Steps for each operating phase: 
(A) Initial startup; 
(B) Normal operations; 
(C) Temporary operations; 
       (D) Emergency shutdown  
(E) Emergency Operations; 
(F) Normal shutdown; and, 
(G) Startup following a turnaround, or after an emergency shutdown. 
 
(ii) Operating limits: 
(A) Consequences of deviation; and 
(B) Steps required to correct or avoid deviation. 
 
(iii) Safety and health considerations: 
(A) Chemical hazard properties 
(B) Precautions/Prevention of exposure 
(C) Control measures  
(D) Quality control  
(E) Any special or unique hazards 
 
(iv) Safety systems and their functions 
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1910.119(f)(2) Operating procedures readily accessible to employees or contractors. 
1910.119(f)(3) The operating procedures shall be reviewed regularly and shall certify annually.  
1910.119(f)(4) The employer shall develop and implement safe work practices such as 
lockout/tagout; confined space entry; opening process equipment or piping; and 




4.2 FRAMEWORK FOR OPERATING PROCEDURES PSM CFR 1910.119(F)  
4.2.1  Compliance with OP 29 CFR 1910.119(f) 
Figure 4.1 in the next page explains how development of OP framework helps to design OP 
Management System. The framework starts by checking the availability of written Operating 
procedures in the pilot plant. If they are not available, management must first develop them and 
if they are available, the process continues to update and review written operating procedures 
from operating phase, operating limits, safety and healthy consideration and last but not least, 
safe work practices. 
According to OSHA PSM, all the requirements stated in the Operating Procedures must be 
consistent with Process Safety Information, CFR 1910.119(d). After that, management must 
ensure the written operating procedure is certified annually. These two steps must be repeated at 
updating and reviewing phase if the data is not consistent or if Operating Procedures not certified 




































Figure 4.1 Framework of OP based on CFR 1910.119(f) 
 
Certified OP 1910.119(f)(3) 
 
Develop written OP  
1910.119(f)(1) 
 
Develop safe work practices 1910.119(f)(4) to provide for the control of 
i. hazards during operation: 
 Lockout/tagout 
 Confined space entry 
 Opening process equipment/piping 
ii. entrance into a facility by personnel 
 
Consistent with PSI 
CFR 1910.119(d) ?  
OP accessible to authorized end-users 1910.119(f)(2) 
 
Yes 
Written OP > 1 year? 
No 
No 
Is written OP available? 
Update/review written OP covering: 
1910.119(f)(1)(i) – 
(A) Initial startup 
1910.119(f)(1)(ii)   
(A) Consequences of deviation from operating phase 
 (B) Steps to correct/avoid deviation 
1910.119(f)(1)(iii) 
(A) Properties of chemicals hazards 
(B) Precautions to prevent chemical exposure 
(C) Control measures  
(D) Quality control for raw materials and hazardous chemical 
inventory levels 
(E) Special hazards 
1910.119(f)(1)(iv) 






Repeat above work-flow for Operating Phase 1910.119(f)(1)(i): 
 (B) Normal Operations 
(C) Temporary Operations 
(D) Emergency Shutdown 
(E) Emergency Operations 
(F) Normal Shutdown 







4.2.2 Using P&ID as Foundation for Data Management  
Process and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) is being used widely in all types of process plants, 
therefore it will be the basis to manage documentation and track required actions related to 
Operating Procedure. The P&IDs is the appropriate diagram that gives details and display 
information for piping engineer and other engineering staff. Software programs that can use 
P&IDs or other useful diagrams may help to fulfil and achieve the OSHA standards and 
requirements. Process Instrumentation & Diagrams (P&IDs) used as the basis for data 
management to track and manage all required information. This will improve end users 

















Figure 4.2 Framework of OP using P&ID as a Foundation 
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4.3 OPERATING PROCEDURES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (OPMS) 
Even though OP requirements can be completed manually, it is better to compile necessary 
information into one specific database. Extraction and tracking will be much easier and less 
time-consuming. Thus, the technique has been transformed into a computer database prototype 
system known as Operating Procedures Management System (OPMS), which articulately 
demonstrate the concept. 
The OPMS is successfully developed in an interactive Microsoft Access environment. In general, 
there are nine (9) interfaces that follow OP framework developed earlier which are; 
Development of Operating Procedures, Initial Start-up, Normal Operation, Temporary Operation, 
Emergency Operation, Emergency Shutdown, Normal Shutdown, Start-up following a 
turnaround or after emergency shutdown and last but not least, Safe Work Practices.  
 
Establishment of the system will assist auditing process to be smooth if the system is proven to 
achieve the project‟s objective. It will have the potential to be commercialized since it helps 
industries to comply with OSHA regulations and requirements. 
 
4.4 CASE STUDY 
To demonstrate the implementation of OP element using OPMS, two case study has been 
conducted on selected nodes of the LPG Treating Unit (LTU) including Amine system and 
Caustic system will be discussed further in this section.  
 
4.4.1 Case Study 1: OPMS for Amine System 
By referring to the concept illustrated in Figure 4.2, the P&ID for LTU section is divided into 
three nodes according to design intention. Figure 4.3 shows the selected node consists of amine 
treater (V-1) with inlet and outlet stream. Author then proceeds to the next stage which is to 






Figure 4.3 Part of the overall P&ID showing Amine Section 
 
i) Development of Operating Procedures 29 CFR 1910.119(f) 
Figure 4.4 shows the „Development of OP‟ interface that consists of „Sub-standard‟, 
'Description', 'Complete', 'Incomplete' and 'Remarks' columns. This main interface can be used to 
assess and monitor all sub-standards of CFR 1910.119(f) easily. Important data will be captured 
and will be stored in a centralized database.  
 
Any comments such as specific incomplete information or conditions can be included in 
'Remarks' column. In a brief, the model actually works as a systematic checklist to ensure end 
users compliance with OP of PSM requirements.  
 
 








ii) Initial Start-up CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(i)(A) 
Figure 4.5 covers operating phase for Initial Start-up procedure. The listed sub-standard of CFR 
1910.119(f)(i-iii) in this window provides guideline to end-users about the critical information 
that needs to be compiled according to OSHA PSM regulations which can be found in the 
„Requirement‟ column.  
Authorized personnel must check whether the required information are already completed or not 
completed yet using systematic checklist. Authorized personnel ensure completeness of collected 
information through status indicated by 'Complete' checkbox.  It is important as it highlights 
which task is yet completed and hence requires further attention. This is done by assigning a 
qualified employee under 'Action By' column and a dateline under 'Reply Date' column. 
Consequently, outstanding tasks can be monitored and completed on time. 
The written procedures have to be reviewed so that the latest or updated procedures are kept on 
the track for affected employees, PSM team reference and auditing purpose as refer to „Evidence 
Location‟ column. Apart from storing data inside the database, the system also allows 
information to be kept in hardcopy folder such as logbook, plant layout, reports and so on. Date 
and the person who approved the revised documents must be extracted and to be filled in the 
„Revision Date‟ and „Approved by‟ tab.  
End users can plan the date for the documents to be revised annually, as intended by PSM 
regulations in „Revalidate‟ column. Assessment on written OP should be done to ensure the 
consistency of operating limit with updated process safety information. From the comments in 
the „Remarks‟ column, authorized personnel can take any required actions timely in order to 
fulfil with the OP requirements. 
The template window for Figure 4.5 works the same for all the other operating phase which are; 
Normal Operation (Figure 4.6), Temporary Operation (Figure 4.7), Emergency Operation 
(Figure 4.8), Emergency Shutdown (Figure 4.9), Normal Shutdown (Figure 4.10) and lastly, 




Based on case study for Amine System that has been conducted, there are a few operating phases 
that is found to be incomplete. For V-1 in Study Node 1 for Amine System, operations for 
normal, temporary, emergency conditions as well as start-up following a turnaround or after 
emergency shutdown are not available for V-1. 
 
One of the gaps that have been captured in the „Remarks‟ column is that, the existed operating 
procedures need to be updated annually. To ensure its validity, authorized personnel must follow 
date suggested in “Due Date” column to provide up-to-date document for end-users.  
 
In addition, the Chemical Safety Datasheet might be existed for V-1 but the management of Plant 
X is not able to provide CSDS existence in their online database system. Thus, authorized 
personnel have to take action and must attach or provide evidence location of the required 
chemical safety datasheet for future reference.  
 
Last but not least, the only requirements that has not been fulfilled is CFR 1910.119(f)(4) which 
is Safe Work Practices. This is due to document unavailability for opening process equipment or 
piping. However, this can be solved by developing the module for the specific safe work 
practices and once it has been approved, all the information must be updated in the system by 
authorized personnel. 
 
In brief, gaps for Operating Procedures that was found on Node 1 that explained as above can be 
overcome by taking further action such as provides a complete OP documentation for all 
operating phases, ensure document validity, attach required documents and also develop module 




Figure 4.5 Amine System: Initial Start-up of OPMS 
 
 








Figure 4.7 Aminex System: Temporary Operation  
 
 





Figure 4.9 Aminex System: Emergency Shutdown 
 
 
Figure 4.10 Aminex System: Normal Shutdown 
 
 





iii) Safe work practices CFR 1910.119(f)(4) 
The last requirement of OP element stated in OSHA PSM is the existence of safe work practices that applies to all end users. These 
safe work practices must be developed and implemented to ensure the control of hazards during operations. Similar to operating 
phases discussed earlier, interface for safe work practices has similar features as other OP. However, there are only four sub-
standards required for safe work practices which are; lockout/tagout, confined space entry, opening process equipment/piping and 
last but not least, control over entrance to a facility by working personnel. 
 
Authorized personnel must check whether the information required are already completed or have not completed yet. The person 
must fill in „Evidence Location‟ tab to monitor and track the documents. Apart from storing data inside the database, the system also 
allows information to be kept in hardcopy folder such as logbook, reports and so on. The experts or the responsible person must 
assess each of the requirement items qualitatively and incorporated comments have to be filled in the „Remarks‟ column. This can be 
captured in Figure 4.12. 
 
 
Figure 4.12 Aminex System: Safe work practices
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4.4.2 Case Study 2: OPMS for Caustic System 
Similar to Amine System, the same workflow applies for Caustic System. By following the 
framework in Figure 3.2, Author proceeds to the next stage which is to conduct and update 
Operating Procedures documentation for V-4 in Study Node 4, as the chosen equipment for 
study purpose. Figure 4.13 shows the part of the overall P&ID showing Caustic Section. 
 
 
 Figure 4.13 Part of the overall P&ID showing Caustic Section 
 
Since OPMS model works the same for all case studies, Author will directly provide a series of 
screenshots for OP analysis that was conducted on V- 4 for Caustic System. 
Based on study conducted on Node 4, there are a few operating phases that is found to be 
incomplete. Three operating phases are not available for V-4 such as temporary operation, 
normal shutdown and start-up following turnaround. This might be due to the reason that all of 









Among the gaps that are found and captured in the „Remarks‟ column is that, the existed 
operating procedures need to be updated annually. The management of Plant X has scheduled to 
review OP documentation almost every three years but OSHA PSM standard has stated that 
written operating procedures must be updated annually to maintain its validity. Therefore, 
authorized personnel must suggest a new suitable date in the „Due Date‟ column to provide up-
to-date document as intended by OSHA. 
 
In the Chemical Safety Datasheet (CSDS), it contains the sub-standard for safety and health 
consideration, CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(iii). However, it was found that the CSDS for V-4 is not 
available. Although it might be existed but Plant X is not able to provide in their online database 
system. Authorized personnel have to take action and attach the required chemical safety 
datasheet for future reference.  
 
Apart from that, requirements for Safe Work Practices has not been fulfilled as specified in CFR 
1910.119(f)(4). This is due to document unavailability for opening process equipment or piping. 
However, this can be solved by developing the module for the specific safe work practices and 
once it has been approved, all the information must be updated in the system by authorized 
personnel. 
 
In short, all the gaps found for V-4 in Study Node 4 can be minimize by taking proper actions as 
suggested in the „Remarks‟ column. Operating Procedures documentation for V-4 can be 
updated by reviewing OP regularly to maintain its annual validity, provide the required chemical 






Figure 4.14 Caustic System: Development of OP 
 
 
Figure 4.15 Caustic System: Initial Start-up 
 
 




Figure 4.17 Caustic System: Temporary Operation 
 
 
Figure 4.18 Caustic System: Emergency Operation 
 
 




Figure 4.20 Caustic System: Normal Shutdown 
 
 
Figure 4.21 Caustic System: Start-up following a turnaround or emergency shutdown 
 
 




CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This project proposes a systematic method for a smooth management of operating procedure at a 
process plant in order to comply with PSM OP CFR 1910.119(f). Several objectives of this study 
which is to analyse PSM requirements for Operating Procedures, developing framework for 
Operating Procedures and developing database prototype tool has assisted end-users to easily 
track information and documents, determine gaps and provide quick solutions in a structured 
manner according to OP of PSM requirements as captured in Remarks column of every OPMS 
interfaces. 
 
Although analysing industrial data took some time to achieve the intended objective, yet the 
proposed system of Operating Procedure Management System is proven to be user-friendly, 
practical and has the potential to be commercialized in any process industry.  
 
As a conclusion, the applied Operating Procedures tool for PSM technique designed in this study 
may aid industry in their efforts towards safe operation and prevention of catastrophic incidents 
in the workplace and surrounding community. 
 
Recommendations: 
1. Apart from Operating Procedures, similar research should be studied for the other thirteen (13) 
PSM elements and combine them together into one specific database system to ensure effective 
implementation of Process Safety Management program. 
2. Continuous research should be conducted at Plant X or at any other process industries while 
given a longer time frame to study Operating Procedures CFR 119.1910(f) more process units 
and/or major process equipment. 
 
3. Responsible custodian must develop and maintain high security for the expert system to 
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Appendix 1: Overall P&ID for Aminex System 
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Appendix 2: Overall P&ID for Thiolex System 
 
